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False beliefs can spread within societies even when they are costly and when individuals
share access to the same objective reality. Research on the cultural evolution of misbeliefs
has demonstrated that a social context can explain what people think, but not whether it also
explains how people think. We shift the focus from the diffusion of false beliefs to the diffusion
of suboptimal belief-formation strategies, and identify a novel mechanism whereby misbeliefs
arise and spread. We show that, when individual decision-makers have access to the data-
gathering behaviour of others, the tendency to make decisions on the basis of insufficient
evidence is amplified, increasing the rate of incorrect, costly decisions. We argue that this
mechanism fills a gap in current explanations of problematic, widespread misbeliefs such as
climate change denial.
Introduction
Humans are inveterate misbelievers (McKay & Dennett,
2009), prone to false beliefs about the self or the world. Mis-
beliefs may spread or be amplified in social groups (Efferson,
McKay, & Fehr, 2020), often in the face of disconfirmatory
evidence, and even when the beliefs are harmful or costly.
Such beliefs — what we might call “collective delusions”
— can have catastrophic social consequences. For exam-
ple, pervasive suspicions that climate change is a hoax perpe-
trated by scientists seeking personal advantage, or that phar-
maceutical companies hide data about the harmful side ef-
fects of vaccines (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013;
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Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013), decrease peo-
ple’s intentions to reduce their carbon footprint (Jolley &
Douglas, 2014b) or to vaccinate (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a),
potentially exacerbating environmental disasters, as well as
public health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic
(Murphy et al., 2021).
To explain socially widespread misbeliefs, psychological
research appeals to two main causal pathways (Fig. 1a).
Though important, we will show that these pathways are in-
sufficient to explain why collective delusions are robust to
disconfirming evidence, or how they are maintained even
when costly to the individuals holding those misbeliefs. We
will argue for the importance of a further pathway (Fig. 1b),
and then demonstrate experimentally that this pathway ex-
ists.
The first pathway in Fig. 1a is a matter of individual psy-
chology, and the key idea is that some people have cogni-
tive propensities that make them more prone to misbeliefs.
For instance, a reliance on an intuitive rather than a reflec-
tive problem-solving style predicts science denial (Gervais,
2015; Lobato & Zimmerman, 2019), belief in the paranormal
or conspiracies (Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018; Wagner-Egger,
Delouvée, Gauvrit, & Dieguez, 2018), and belief in fake
news (Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand, & Cannon, 2019;
Lazer et al., 2018). People who trust their intuitions also tend
to make decisions with less evidence (Ross et al., 2016). This
tendency to “jump to conclusions” (JTC) is thought to play

















Figure 1. Causal models including individual factors, social factors, and their effects on false beliefs. (a) Most psychology research shows
how individual and social learning both contribute, independently, to misbeliefs. (b) We aim to test, experimentally, whether a further
pathway exists, whereby social information amplifies individual cognitive biases in a way that increase the risk of false beliefs. We note that
further causal models are possible (e.g., a moderating effect of individual cognitive learning on the social pathway), but these do not concern
us here since they do not involve a pathway from social information to individual cognition.
As stand-alone mechanisms, however, such biases do not
provide a compelling account of collective delusions. In par-
ticular, a general tendency to adopt beliefs unreflectively or
on limited evidence may lead individuals astray in random
ways, but in itself will not support collective adherence to
the same, specific false belief about the world.
Other types of cognitive bias, however, can boost the
spread of beliefs with specific contents (Claidière & Sper-
ber, 2007; Griffiths, Kalish, & Lewandowsky, 2008). For
example, a particular belief (e.g., that vaccines or genetically
modified foods are harmful) may spread and endure, in part,
because it resonates with implicit cognitive proclivities and
prejudices (Miton & Mercier, 2015), such as an essentialist
bias that maps genetic modification onto tampering with an
organism’s essence, or a teleological bias that casts genetic
modification as perverting the course of nature (Blancke,
Van Breusegem, De Jaeger, Braeckman, & Van Montagu,
2015). Nevertheless, if certain types of content are simply
intrinsically more appealing to human cognition in some uni-
versal sense, as per this account, then one would expect the
resulting misbeliefs to be fairly ubiquitous, in which case
something else is needed to explain why only some groups —
but not others — arrive at collective misconstruals of reality.
Accordingly, the second pathway in Fig. 1a is social: peo-
ple may espouse a false belief, not necessarily because of
any particular deficiency in their belief-formation process,
but because they are influenced by the beliefs of those around
them (Asch, 1951; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Sherif, 1935).
In the examples of collective delusion discussed above, the
relevant beliefs often cohere with the ideology of a social
group whose membership is part of one’s identity (Kahan,
2013; Rutjens, Heine, Sutton, & van Harreveld, 2018). For
example, science denial correlates with both political and re-
ligious identity (Barone, Petto, & Campbell, 2014; Drum-
mond & Fischhoff, 2017; Jylhä & Hellmer, 2020; Rutjens,
Heine, et al., 2018; Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018).
However, the evidence for a link between social identity
and misbelief is typically correlational, rather than experi-
mental, and thus cannot support claims about causation or
explanation. What experimental evidence there is for the
social pathway relies on somewhat artificial manipulations.
For instance, in Sherif’s autokinetic effect, in which the per-
ception that a stationary point of light in an otherwise dark
environment is moving can be influenced by the reports of
others, participants could not rely on any empirical evidence
to establish the truth of the matter. In contrast, collective
delusions are held despite a wealth of empirical evidence at-
testing to the reality of climate change and vaccine safety.
Similarly, the conformity experiments of Asch (1951, 1955)
relied on deliberate deceit. However, such conformity is un-
stable without the continued influence of deceit (Jacobs &
Campbell, 1961), whereas collective delusions seem to be
sincerely held and stable.
Thus, although both social and individual pathways con-
tribute to collective delusions, neither pathway on its own
is adequate to explain key features of collective delusions.
However, the problem runs even deeper: psychological re-
search has tended to ignore the phenomenon of aggregation
dynamics, whereby individual psychological processes scale
up — in often unpredictable ways — to group-level phenom-
ena. This aspect of social belief is more commonly studied
in the field of Cultural Evolution.
Cultural Evolution posits similar dual pathways, distin-
guishing individual learning — where individuals gather
their own information about the environment — from social
learning — where they learn from other individuals (Boyd &
Richerson, 1985; Laland, 2004; Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hop-
pitt, & Laland, 2011). In particular, cultural evolutionary the-
ory suggests that when individuals conform to those around
them, groups may converge either on an equilibrium in which
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everyone has an accurate view of the world and behaves ac-
cordingly, or on some other equilibrium in which everyone
has an inaccurate view and behaves accordingly (Boyd &
Richerson, 1985; Efferson, Lalive, Richerson, McElreath, &
Lubell, 2008; Efferson et al., 2020; Morgan & Laland, 2012).
Thus, a combination of individual and social learning seems
to explain why — sometimes, at least — a group can collec-
tively form the same false belief.
Although early experimental work seemed to support this
theoretical claim (Anderson & Holt, 1997), the misbeliefs
formed by these processes were later shown to be unstable
(Goeree, Palfrey, Rogers, & McKelvey, 2007). In particu-
lar, if even just a few people in the group engage in individ-
ual learning, gathering even a small amount of information
about the actual state of the world, this has profound knock-
on effects on aggregate social dynamics by destabilizing out-
comes in which most people in the group are wrong, thus
pushing the group toward an accurate understanding of their
environment (Efferson et al., 2020; Goeree et al., 2007; Per-
reault, Moya, & Boyd, 2012).
Thus, the aggregate dynamics of individual and social
learning do not explain how collective delusions are stable
over time when there is even a trickle of accurate informa-
tion about the environment. Indeed, one of the most puz-
zling features of collective delusions is how robust they are in
the face of disconfirming evidence (e.g., that climate change
is real and vaccines are beneficial). Thus, a core aspect of
this phenomenon crying out for explanation is how collec-
tive delusions can be resistant to the steady flow of empirical
evidence, since the findings from cultural evolution show that
they are susceptible to just that. Clearly, then, something is
missing from the schema in Fig. 1a.
There are thus challenges on multiple fronts for the current
state of the art in experimental psychology: to explain how
collective delusions persist even though a small trickle of ev-
idence is able to destabilize the effect of social learning, and
to explain how the same delusion can be widespread within
one group but not another, if driven by individual biases. This
is our point of departure in the present study. Here, we test
whether another causal pathway exists, whereby social in-
formation affects the learning biases themselves (Fig. 1b),
in addition to the beliefs those biases occasion. Can social
context explain not just what people learn, but also how they
learn? This question entails a shift in focus, from the diffu-
sion of false beliefs to the diffusion of suboptimal learning
strategies, and implicates a novel catalyst for the emergence
of destructive, socially shared misbeliefs.
There is qualitative evidence (Metz, Weisberg, & Weis-
berg, 2018) and evidence from computational modeling
(Druckman & McGrath, 2019) suggesting that this pathway
is plausible. One specific mechanism suggested by such re-
search is that people vary in their estimation of the value of
relevant evidence, and this variation may depend on social
factors. However, there is no experimental evidence demon-
strating the existence of this pathway. We aim to show exper-
imentally that social information can amplify an individual
learning bias, such that people grow more likely to under-
value empirical evidence.
We do this by adapting a probabilistic reasoning task —
the Beads Task (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988) — which
is known to reveal biased data-gathering behavior in clinical
and healthy populations: people frequently jump to conclu-
sions, making decisions with insufficient evidence (Furl &
Averbeck, 2011; Garety & Freeman, 2013; McLean, Mat-
tiske, & Balzan, 2017; Ross, McKay, Coltheart, & Langdon,
2015; Van der Leer, Hartig, Goldmanis, & McKay, 2015).
The task involves randomly drawing colored beads from an
urn, in order to discover the color of the majority of beads
in the urn. The task affords participants the opportunity to
gather their own data about the objective state of the world
(the majority color in the urn). However, as participants can
decide how much data they would like to gather (specifi-
cally, how many beads they would like to draw), differences
in data-gathering strategies may lead to participants holding
different beliefs about the state of the world. If participants
form false beliefs about the majority color in the urn because
they do not gather enough evidence, it is not because the ev-
idence is unavailable (as per Sherif, 1936) or deceptive (as
per Asch, 1951).
To explore whether a social context can amplify this in-
dividual learning bias, we embed the Beads Task in a social
transmission-chain procedure (Fig. 2a). In such a proce-
dure, participants are randomly assigned to different chains
or groups. Within each group, an initial participant (as-
signed to position 1 within their group) undertakes the Beads
Task. Subsequently, a second participant (assigned to posi-
tion 2 within their group) is given information about the first
participant’s data-gathering strategy before also undertaking
the Beads Task. Thereafter, the participant in position 3 is
given information about the data-gathering decisions of par-
ticipants in positions 1 and 2, and so on. Fig. 2b illustrates
how this might appear to a participant in position 11 within a
particular chain. All participants within a chain are drawing
from the same (virtual) urn, and thus face the same state of
the world.
To evaluate the effect of social information, we contrasted
the above procedure (which describes the social condition)
with an asocial condition. In the asocial condition, partici-
pants were told what position they were in within their group
(purely to make the task as similar as possible to the social
condition), but were not given information about the deci-
sions of previous participants. Thus, the presence or absence
of social information is the only difference between condi-
tions.
We tested whether individual tendencies to jump to con-
clusions on limited evidence would increase when those indi-
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on memory) and the bead was replaced in the urn (Fig. 1). After 15 beads had been drawn,
participants were asked what they thought the majority color in the urn was. They were
told whether they were correct and how much additional money they had earned.
Figure 1 . A screenshot of the experiment interface for a participant in the social condition
in generation 11 of their chain. The number of beads seen by the previous 10 generations
are shown with black dots. In this example, the focal participant has already drawn three
beads (which happen to have been green, pink, pink, recorded in the final column), so they
have already spent $0.03 of their $0.15 endowment. They are reminded of the costs and
bonuses and asked to decide whether they want to pay to see another bead, or have seen
enough to be confident about the majority color in this urn. The asocial control would
appear similar, except that the previous generations would lack any black dots indicating
the number of beads seen by each previous participant. The horizontal blue line is merely a
convenience to help participants compare their decisions with those of previous generations.
Finally, participants answered some demographic questions, including age, gender,
and whether they were a native speaker of English (1906 indicated they were). They were
also able to leave comments if they wished.
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Figure 2. (a) A schematic illus at n f th ra s issio -c in roce u e. 2000 partici nts are divided into 100 groups, with participants
in ac roup being arr ged i a chain of 20 ositio s r g ra ions. In he so ial co ition (odd-n mb red ch ins, green), participants
r give i form tion b t the data-g th r ng dec s ons of p vio s p rt cipa s who ad don the t sk. In th asoci l condition (even-
numbered chains, r d) par i pants are given mi imal informat on: they a just told the r position with n the group. (b) A screenshot of
the experiment interface for a participant in the social condition in position 11 of their chain. The number of beads seen by participants in
each of the prev us 0 p tio s are show with bl ck dot . I s xample, the focal part cipant has already drawn three beads (which
happen to have been green, pink, pink, recorded in the final column), so they have already spent $0.03 of their $0.15 endowment. They are
reminded of th costs and bonuses a d asked t decide wh t r they w nt to pay to s another bead, or whether they have seen enough.
The as cial control condi ion would appe r milar, xcept that th revious p sitio s ould lack a y black dots indicating the number of
beads seen by each previous participant. The horizontal blue line is merely a convenience to help participants compare their decisions with
those of previous positions.
iduals ca observe th evidence-gathering behavi r of oth-
ers in their chain (the social condition), relative to those who
can ot (the social control). We stress that nd viduals in e
social condition receive veridical information about others’
data-gathering decisions (Fig. 2b), whereas classical con-
formity experiments involving misbelief (e.g. Asch, 1951,
1955) employ deceptive confederates who deliberately mis-
inform participants. Our experiment is thus aimed at explain-
ing misbelief in the absence of deliberate deception. Partic-
ipants in both conditions pay a cost (from an endowment)
each time they wish to gain some information by drawing a
bead, but they win a bonus if they correctly guess the color of
the majority of beads in the urn. This combination of incen-
tives allows us to infer how much participants value the in-
formation, and to classify participants’ decisions as optimal
or sub-optimal (Van der Leer et al., 2015).
To avoid a potential confound, participants in the social
condition were only told how many beads had been drawn by
previous participants (cf. Fig. 2b). They were not told what
color those beads were, nor what each participant thought
the color of the majority of the beads in the urn was. They
were also not told how profitable the decisions of the previ-
ous participants were. Otherwise, participants in the social
condition would gain additional information about the urn,
thus simplifying their task. As it is, the social information
w pr vid d is strictly irrel ant to ach person’s decision,
because beads are drawn randomly, and this experiment is
thus not merely about probi th social pathway in Fig. 1a
in more depth.
As the statistical decisions involved in performing the
Beads Task can be rather complex, we propose a series of
related hypotheses. Each hypothesis models participants’ be-
havior as a function of inputs of varying complexity. For in-
stance, a parsimonious view might be that participants are
sensitive to the number of beads drawn and nothing else,
from which we derive H1 below. Participants may also be
sensitive to the quality of that information (yielding H3 be-
low). The most complex model — but the only one able to
distinguish optimal from suboptimal behavior — is if par-
ticipants are additionally sensitive to the costs incurred in
gathering that evidence and to the likelihood of winning the
bonus, as a function of further draws (yielding H2). Finally,
we can remain agnostic as to the belief-formation processes
themselves, and simply measure how likely it is that partic-
ipants are to form true or false beliefs about the color of the
majority of beads (H4).
H1 Participants will gather less evidence (draw fewer
beads) in the social condition than in the asocial con-
dition (‘JTC in a relative sense’).
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H2 Participants will be more likely to jump to conclusions
(making objectively premature decisions) in the social
condition than in the asocial condition (‘JTC in an ab-
solute sense’).
H3 Participants in the social condition will make their de-
cisions about the majority color of the urn at a point of
lower objective certainty than will participants in the
asocial condition.
H4 Participants will be more likely to form inaccurate be-
liefs about the state of the world in the social condition,
relative to the asocial control.
We pre-registered our data-collection procedures, exper-




We used the Turkprime platform (L. Litman, Robinson,
& Abberbock, 2017) to recruit 2000 participants (1072 fe-
male, 909 male, the remainder choosing to self-describe their
gender, or not to respond to this question; age: M = 36.6,
S D = 13.8) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service (MTurk).
Given that no previous data on the social effect under inves-
tigation here exist, rather than undertaking a power analysis,
we sought to ensure that we had more participants per con-
dition (here, 1000 per condition) than the largest-yet study
using the Beads Task had (558 overall, in Ross et al., 2016).
Participation was limited to those with IP addresses reg-
istered in the USA, who had MTurk approval ratings of at
least 95%, and who had completed at least 100 tasks on
MTurk. Participants were paid a base rate of $0.50. Addi-
tionally, they were given an endowment of $0.15, and were
awarded a bonus of $0.92 if they guessed the correct urn.
They used the $0.15 endowment to pay $0.01 each time they
wanted to draw a bead and see its color. They could thus
afford to draw up to 15 beads, and retained any unspent
endowment. This incentive scheme was designed so that,
on average, the optimal number of beads to draw (assum-
ing risk neutrality) would fall in the middle of the range, to
avoid floor or ceiling effects (for the relevant calculations,
see https://osf.io/wfbuq/).
Before participating, participants provided informed con-
sent. The consent form included information about the incen-
tives, and informed participants that there would be compre-
hension tests. The study received ethical approval through
the Royal Holloway, University of London self-certification
process.
Materials
We coded the experiment using the jsPsych JavaScript
Library (De Leeuw, 2015). To avoid participants misun-
derstanding the nature of the task (Balzan, Delfabbro, Gal-
letly, & Woodward, 2012), we provided detailed written in-
structions and incorporated extensive comprehension checks.
Both the instructions and the trial itself were accompanied by
animated visual illustrations, so that participants could see
the beads being drawn and replaced in the urn, rather than
just being told textually that this was the case. The experi-
ment script is available via https://osf.io/9f2ks/, as is a link
to a demonstration of the task.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 100 groups
of 20 people each. Fifty of the groups were in the social
condition, in which each participant was shown the number
of beads seen by each of the people in the group who had
previously drawn beads. Fifty of the groups were in the aso-
cial condition, where participants saw the number of people
in their group who had previously drawn beads, but not how
many beads each of these people had drawn Fig. 2b. For the
first person in each group the social and asocial groups were
identical, because there were no prior persons in the group
whose behavior could be displayed.
Participants were given a demonstration of the task, com-
prising both textual instructions and animations that visually
illustrated the procedure.
First, participants were shown two sets of 100 beads each.
Each bead was either pink or green, and the two sets’ colors
were in complementary ratios (i.e., one set had 60 green and
40 pink beads; the other 40 green and 60 pink). Each set
of beads was shuffled and dropped into one of two urns, to
obscure the beads’ colors. The urns were shuffled so that par-
ticipants did not know which urn had which majority color.
Then one urn was removed, while the other remained on the
screen. Participants were told that 15 beads would be drawn
with replacement from the remaining urn, and that their task
was to decide how many of these beads they wished to see
before choosing what color the majority of the beads in the
urn was. For details of the randomization procedure (includ-
ing an inconsequential coding error) see https://osf.io/9f2ks/.
After a demonstration of the task, participants’ compre-
hension was tested. For instance, they were asked whether
beads were drawn from one urn or both (answer: one), and
whether the ratio of beads remained constant over time (an-
swer: true). They could proceed only when they scored
100% on the comprehension test, and otherwise looped
through the demonstration and instructions again, as many
times as were necessary to score 100%. 72% of participants
passed this comprehension test on the first attempt.
Second, the incentives were explained, including the
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$0.15 endowment (from which they paid a $0.01 cost to see
each bead) and the $0.92 bonus for correctly guessing the
urn’s majority color at the end of the trial.
Third, the social nature of the experiment was explained
to participants in all positions except the first in each chain:
either each participant would simply see the number of pre-
ceding decision makers in the chain (asocial control), or each
participant would additionally see the number of beads that
each of the preceding decision makers had chosen to see (so-
cial condition).
Finally, their comprehension of the incentive structure and
social aspect was tested. As previously, they could proceed
only when they scored 100% on the comprehension test.
Otherwise the relevant demonstrations were repeated. 80%
of participants passed this comprehension test on the first at-
tempt.
When the trial began, participants were shown what po-
sition they were in, and (with the exception of participants
in the first position) were told which condition they were
in. To avoid participants drawing fewer beads just to end
the task early (Van der Leer et al., 2015), all participants had
to draw 15 beads but they only paid a cost if they chose to
see the color of a drawn bead. When they decided they had
seen enough beads, all subsequent draws (if any) were greyed
out and did not incur a cost. Each time a participant paid to
draw a bead, its color was recorded on screen (to avoid a de-
pendence on memory) and the bead was replaced in the urn
(Fig. 2b). After 15 beads had been drawn, participants were
asked what they thought the majority color in the urn was.
They were told whether they were correct and how much ad-
ditional money they had earned.
Finally, participants answered some demographic ques-
tions, including age, gender, and whether they were a native
speaker of English (1906 indicated they were). They were
also able to leave comments if they wished.
Results
Pre-registered analyses
Analyses were pre-registered at https://osf.io/db3ws and
carried out in R (R Core Team, 2018). The full analysis
script is available at https://osf.io/9f2ks. This includes tech-
nical details for the analyses described below, such as ran-
dom effects structures. In general, we report the results of
(generalized) linear mixed-effects models built with pack-
age lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011), including 95%
bootstrapped confidence intervals for fixed-effect coefficients
(generated by function bootMer from the same package),
where possible. We use package lmerTest (Kuznetsova,
Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017) to provide p-values and
package glmmTMB (Brooks et al., 2017) for more complex
(e.g., beta or zero-inflated) regression models.
We hypothesized that participants in the social condition
would show a relative JTC bias (H1), indexed by taking
fewer draws to decision (DTD) than those in the asocial
control. Overall, the mean DTD was 6.55 (bootstrapped
95% CIs [6.317, 6.782]). DTD in the social condition was
significantly lower than the asocial condition (linear mixed-
effects regression, B = −0.69 [−1.262,−0.158], S E = 0.289,
t = −2.388, p = 0.019, Fig. 3a). Thus, social information
amplified JTC in a relative sense. There was no main ef-
fect of position (B = −0.019 [−0.057, 0.019], S E = 0.02,
t = −0.946, p = 0.344) and no interaction between posi-
tion and condition (B = 0.005 [−0.083, 0.097], S E = 0.045,
t = 0.108, p = 0.914). Thus, the social amplification effect
did not detectably increase over time. We discuss possible
reasons for this in the more detailed analysis (which includes
R scripts) at https://osf.io/9f2ks.
To evaluate absolute JTC (H2) we calculated an expected-
value matrix representing the probable payout for all possi-
ble states, where each state is defined by the following two
values.
• ∆: the absolute difference in the number of beads of
each color (so if 3 green and 3 pink beads are drawn,
∆ = 0, and if 3 green and 5 pink beads or 5 green and
3 pink beads are drawn, ∆ = 2).
• t: time — counted as number of draws — since the
start of the trial, such that before any beads have been
drawn t = 0 and after 15 beads have been drawn,
t = 15.
The expected value in each state depends on the cost paid
to see t beads and the probability of winning the bonus as
a function of ∆ (if we assume participants pick the majority
color if ∆ > 0 and pick randomly if ∆ = 0). Based on these
expected values, if a rational decision is just a decision that
would maximise the agent’s expected payoff, then a corre-
sponding decision matrix can be calculated for each possible
state, where the decision is represented as 0 if it is rational in
that state to pay to see another bead, and 1 if it is rational to
stop paying.
Our full calculations for this decision matrix are available
at https://osf.io/wfbuq/, but we provide a brief and informal
overview of a single such decision here, for the sake of illus-
tration. The full decision matrix simply generalizes this kind
of decision.
Imagine that a participant has drawn 14 beads. If 7 beads
are pink and 7 are green, then at that point, there is a 50%
chance of guessing correctly, since there is no evidence either
way (∆ = 0, in the terminology of our analyses). Thus, stop-
ping at 14 beads in this scenario would yield a 50% chance
of winning the 92 cent bonus, yielding an expected value of
0.5 ∗ 92 = 46 cents. However, if the participant were to draw
one more bead, they would be in one of two possible states.
They could either end up in a state where they have 7 pink
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and 8 green or one with 8 pink and 7 green beads. In both
cases, ∆ = 1. When ∆ = 1, there is a 60% chance of guessing
correctly. If they draw one more bead, the expected value of
the bonus will be 0.6 ∗ 92 = 55.2 cents. It would cost them
an additional cent if they wish to proceed after the 14th bead,
but this cent would yield an increase of 9.2 cents in expected
winnings, so it is worth drawing the final bead. However, if
a participant did stop after 14 beads, they would be classed
as Jumping to Conclusions.
Overall, a high proportion of participants jumped to
conclusions (mean = 0.67, bootstrapped 95% CIs [0.652,
0.693]). If participants were aiming at the optimal point and
if they erred randomly (i.e., were equally likely to undershoot
as to overshoot), we might expect fewer than 50% of them
to undershoot (given that some participants might not err at
all). Since the bootstrapped CIs don’t contain the value 0.5,
the data reflect an overall tendency to jump to conclusions,
consistent with findings in the literature (Furl & Averbeck,
2011; Van der Leer et al., 2015).
We hypothesized that social information would amplify an
absolute JTC bias, and that participants would thus be more
likely to jump to conclusions in the social condition than in
the asocial control (H2). As predicted, participants were sig-
nificantly more likely to jump to conclusions in the social
condition relative to the asocial control (binomial mixed-
effects regression B = 0.299 [0.049, 0.562], S E = 0.129,
z = 2.315, p = 0.021, Fig. 3b). Thus, the social context am-
plified the JTC bias. Again, there was no effect of the partici-
pant’s position within their chain (B = 0.012[−0.005, 0.031],
S E = 0.009, z = 1.309, p = 0.19), and no interaction be-
tween condition and position (B = −0.021 [−0.058, 0.014],
S E = 0.017, z = −1.203, p = 0.229).
For H3, we hypothesized that participants would make
their decision at a point of lower objective certainty in the
social condition than in the asocial control. ‘Objective cer-
tainty’ here means the posterior probability that an ideal
Bayesian agent would have after observing a given realized
sequence of beads (as a function of ∆). Overall, partici-
pants decided with mean objective certainty of 0.67 (boot-
strapped 95% CIs [0.669, 0.68]). Participants in the social
condition decided at a significantly lower objective certainty
(beta mixed-effects regression, B = −0.08 [−0.136,−0.025],
S E = 0.028, z = −2.826, p = 0.005). There was no ef-
fect of position (B = −0.003 [−0.007, 0.001], S E = 0.002,
z = −1.336, p = 0.181) and no significant interaction be-
tween condition and position (B = 0.002 [−0.007, 0.011],
S E = 0.004, z = 0.452, p = 0.652).
Finally, we hypothesized that participants in the social
condition would be less accurate (H4). Accuracy here is a
binary variable with value 1 if the participant guessed the
correct urn, and 0 otherwise. Overall, mean accuracy was
0.75 (bootstrapped 95% CIs [0.73, 0.768]). Participants in
the social condition were significantly less accurate (bino-
mial mixed-effects regression, B = −0.267 [−0.47,−0.059],
S E = 0.104, z = −2.579, p = 0.01). Again, there was no
effect of position (B = −0.014 [−0.031, 0.005], S E = 0.009,
z = −1.522, p = 0.128) and no interaction between condi-
tion and position (B = 0.029 [−0.006, 0.065], S E = 0.018,
z = 1.623, p = 0.105).
We thus found a significant effect of condition for all four
pre-registered hypotheses, but no effect of position and no
interaction between condition and position. A social context
has thus amplified the Jumping to Conclusions bias, increas-
ing the likelihood that people would make costly decisions
on the basis of insufficient evidence.
Exploratory analyses
On average participants earned $1.27 (bootstrapped 95%
CIs [1.258, 1.291])1. Participants in the social condition
earned significantly less (linear mixed-effects regression,
B = −0.039 [−0.072,−0.006], S E = 0.017, t = −2.299,
p = 0.022). Thus, a social context has amplified the JTC
bias enough to cause costly misbeliefs.
The range of DTDs — the socially transmitted informa-
tion — is distributed as in Fig. 4a, which shows a number
of striking features. Most obviously, the most common re-
sponses were on the extremes: participants frequently drew
0 beads or the maximum 15. This behavior is consistent with
reliance on some form of heuristic, rather than calculating
(or even roughly estimating) probabilities, costs or benefits.
Based on participants’ comments (left optionally at the end
of the study), we describe two potential such heuristics.
The first plausible heuristic is to gain the maximum
amount of information, exemplified by comments such as ‘I
definitely felt it was worth .15 to get the maximum amount of
information,’ or ‘I was going to guess pink after 10 beads but
it wasn’t worth the 5 cents to risk being wrong.’ The second
heuristic is the (mistaken) intuition that the information pro-
vided by the beads is worthless — in the sense that winning
the bonus would remain a 50:50 chance no matter how many
beads are drawn — whereas the endowment, if unspent, is
a sure thing. This is exemplified by comments such as ‘I
decided not to see any beads because 60/40 was close to a
coinflip so I figured the .15 was “a bird in the hand”’, or,
‘I figured my odds of guessing would be virtually no better
by spending any endowment to see the beads. Even if I did
spend the entire endowment my odds of guessing the ma-
jority correctly wouldn’t have been much different than just
guessing.’
1In order to ensure a more acceptable rate of payment (e.g.,
$14.00 per hour in California in 2021), we offer the following two
suggestions that we have adopted since running this (our first study
on MTurk with bonuses depending in part on random outcomes).
First, budget on the assumption that all participants will win the
maximal bonus. Second, ensure the base rate (without bonuses) is




















































Figure 3. Plots of the outcome variables for each pre-registered hypothesis. Where the outcome variable is numeric (a, c), the plot shows
the individual datapoints (jittered to avoid overlap) and kernel density estimates (‘raincloud’ plots, Allen, Poggiali, Whitaker, Marshall, &



























Figure 4. Histograms plotting (a) the distribution of draws to decision (DTD) and (b) ∆ at decision (∆AD), colored by condition.
Another striking feature of Fig. 4a is that the counts for
most DTDs are very similar between conditions, except for
the extremes of the distribution. Thus, the effect of condition
seems to be driven largely by participants in the social con-
dition being more likely to decide without seeing any beads,
and less likely to draw the maximum.
For ease of modelling, we first reframe the issue in terms
of the quantity of diagnostic evidence seen, indexed by ∆ at
decision (or ∆AD), rather than number of beads seen. If two
participants saw 5 beads before picking an urn, but partici-
pant A saw 1 green and 4 pink and participant B saw 3 green
and 2 pink, then the ∆AD for participant A is 3 and for partic-
ipant B is 1. In this case, participant A has a better chance of
guessing the right urn even though they had the same DTD.
Two of the outcome variables already considered (JTC and
objective confidence) are a function of ∆. In a sense, then,
∆ is psychologically simpler than those outcome variables,
which require additional calculation. If participants are rely-
ing on simpler heuristics, as suggested above, then simpler
input variables such as this may be informative.
The variable ∆AD is distributed as shown in Fig. 4b. We
model this count variable with a Poisson regression. Addi-
tionally, we include a zero-inflation component to model the
spike where ∆AD = 0. Table 1 shows two versions of the
zero-inflation component: one with only an intercept (Model
1) and one with a term for condition (Model 2). Model 1
tests whether there are significantly more zeroes overall in
this distribution than expected under a Poisson model, and
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Model 2 tests whether there are significantly more zeroes in
the social condition in particular. When the zero-inflation
component excludes condition (Model 1), the Poisson com-
ponent has a significant negative effect of condition: ∆AD was
lower in the social condition, so participants in that condi-
tion saw significantly less diagnostic evidence before decid-
ing. When the zero-inflation component includes condition
(Model 2), there is a significant positive effect of condition,
but condition becomes non-significant in the Poisson compo-
nent. Thus, participants in the social condition were signifi-
cantly more likely to decide without any diagnostic evidence
(where ∆AD = 0), and once this factor is accounted for, the
two conditions are otherwise not significantly different. The
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for Model 1 is 6816.84
and for Model 2, AIC = 6812.69. With a difference in AIC of
approximately 4, there is positive evidence for Model 2 rel-
ative to Model 1. Thus, we conclude that social information
increased the likelihood that participants decided without any
diagnostic evidence.
Finally, we note that social transmission effects tend
to vary widely across chains. This reflects the kind of
path-dependence associated with frequency-dependent so-
cial learning strategies like conformity (Boyd & Richerson,
1985), though the domain of interest here concerns how to
learn, rather than the behavior itself. For illustrative pur-
poses, we plot the cumulative rate of accuracy in each chain
in Fig. 5.
These by-group patterns show that no chain in the aso-
cial control was anything other than overwhelmingly accu-
rate, whereas this tendency was reduced in the social condi-
tion. We will highlight several features of the specific paths
in Fig. 5 that speak to this claim. In the asocial control, 3
chains maintained 100% accuracy past position 10, whereas
only 1 chain in the social condition did. Fourteen chains in
the asocial control ended up with a cumulative accuracy ≥
0.8 compared to 5 in the social condition. Only 2 chains in
the asocial condition ended with cumulative accuracy ≤ 0.6
whereas 10 chains in the social condition did. Indeed, only
in the social condition was any chain more wrong than right
by the end (with cumulative accuracy < 0.5 in position 20,
in the chain highlighted in black). Such a chain represents a
form of “collective delusion”, where most people in the chain
make costly, incorrect decisions.
Discussion
We used a social-transmission experiment to study
whether a social context would amplify individual data-
gathering biases. In a task that involved drawing colored
beads from an urn to decide the color of the majority of beads
in the urn, participants in a social condition were shown how
much evidence had been gathered by each previous partici-
pant in their chain. Compared to participants in an asocial
control condition, social condition participants drew fewer
control social






















Figure 5. The cumulative proportion of participants guessing cor-
rectly in each chain. For the sake of illustration, one chain in the
social condition is highlighted in black; the remaining chains are
colored by condition, and are lightened so that the overlap of more
than one chain can be indicated with deeper reds or blues. In the
highlighted chain, the participant in position 1 guessed correctly (so
the cumulative proportion correct at position 1 is 1). The participant
in position 2 in the same chain guessed incorrectly, so the cumula-
tive value in position 2 is 1+02 , or 0.5. The participant in position 3
likewise guessed incorrectly, so the cumulative value at that point
is 1+0+03 . By position 20, this illustrative chain was overall more
incorrect than correct.
beads, were more likely to jump to conclusions and to arrive
at false beliefs, and earned less money.
Importantly, it was not the false beliefs themselves that
were transmitted socially, as social condition participants
were not given information about the decisions of their fore-
bears regarding the state of the world (the majority color of
beads in the urn), nor were they privy to the nature of the
evidence previous participants had observed (the sequence
of beads). Rather, what was transmitted was information
about the belief-formation processes of others. What we have
shown, with a carefully incentivized paradigm, is that people
can socially acquire a disregard for evidence per se. Thus,
not only is there a causal pathway from social information to
individual cognitive bias (Fig. 1b), but this specific bias —
the Jumping to Conclusions bias — directly impacts individ-
ual learning by causing people to gather less evidence about
the state of the world.
We have argued that individual factors alone cannot ex-
plain why misbeliefs are socially widespread, while social
factors cannot explain why misbeliefs are stable, given that
even a trickle of information about the world — gathered
via individual learning — can destabilize social traditions of
misbelief (Goeree et al., 2007). In this light, our result repre-
sents an advance towards understanding collective delusions,
because we have shown not only how social and individ-
ual factors can interact, but also how social information can
10 JUSTIN SULIK
Table 1
Parameters for mixed-effects zero-inflated Poisson regressions, modeling the effect of condition on ∆ at decision (∆AD) with a random
intercept for chain.
Component Parameter
Model 1 Model 2
B SE z p B SE z p
Poisson
Intercept 0.889 0.024 36.62 <0.001*** 0.875 0.025 34.58 <0.001***
Condition -0.074 0.035 -2.11 0.035* -0.043 0.037 -1.16 0.246
Zero-infl.
Intercept -1.578 0.081 -19.58 <0.001*** -1.78 0.124 -14.31 <0.001***
Condition - - - - 0.398 0.162 2.45 0.0142*
make participants significantly more likely to refrain from
gathering evidence about the world.
We have thus identified a novel mechanism that helps ex-
plain costly social misbelief. Moreover, our work also rep-
resents a methodological advance. Whereas classical con-
formity experiments (e.g., Asch, 1955) typically require “ex-
ogenous” sources of misbelief, such as deceptive confeder-
ates who deliberately misinform participants, the mechanism
we identify is “endogenous” in that misbeliefs arise naturally
without artificial influence, due to participants’ cognitive bi-
ases. Further, as participants took part online (as compared
with Asch’s study, where participants gave responses in full
view of confederate ‘participants’), this result is unlikely to
be explained by social pressures to comply (cf. Levy, 1960),
though it may still represent a general bias towards social
learning (Perreault et al., 2012).
Another strand of psychological research into conformity
(the autokinetic effect, Sherif, 1936) involves cases where
participants are artificially deprived of the ability to weigh
empirical evidence directly and objectively. In contrast, our
paradigm makes objective evidence available to all partici-
pants. Our incentives are designed to make it always optimal
to draw at least a few beads, yet many participants chose not
to gather any evidence at all, and social information boosted
this tendency. The results thus speak to the puzzle of why
groups of humans can believe demonstrably false things, by
showing that a social context can amplify a tendency to un-
dersample potentially disconfirming evidence.
Apart from these theoretical and methodological contribu-
tions, our results have three main implications for the future
study of misbeliefs in the real world, where the objective
value of information is not always clear, and where other
people’s information gathering habits are not so explicitly
available.
First, these results can be construed as showing that a so-
cial context can shift the balance between reliance on ex-
ternal evidence and reliance on introspection, gut feelings,
or subjective intuitions. Multiple participants expressed the
false intuition that the beads were informationally worthless,
believing the 60:40 ratio to be close enough to 50:50 that it
was roughly at chance. Thus, they privileged their intuition
over the readily available evidence. As mentioned earlier, an
intuitive cognitive style — where people assent to the first,
intuitive explanation that occurs to them, rather than probing
further — predicts belief in fake news (Bronstein et al., 2019;
Pennycook & Rand, 2020) and disbelief in science (Gervais,
2015; Lobato & Zimmerman, 2019). Our results suggest
the intriguing possibility that the effect of intuitive cognitive
style can be amplified by particular social contexts. It would
be interesting to see how far this possibility extends. For
instance, people who endorse evolution are more likely to
justify their beliefs with reference to evidence, whereas peo-
ple who deny evolution are more likely to justify their beliefs
based on what they feel to be ‘true in their heart’ (Metz et al.,
2018). Naturally, this example is confounded with religious
factors, and yet that does not preclude the possibility that
part of the explanation may be a socially learned disregard
for empirical evidence, as religious belief is itself correlated
with intuitive cognitive style (Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, &
Fugelsang, 2016).
Second, our results offer a concrete way to understand so-
cial misbeliefs in light of what is known about clinical and
sub-clinical delusions. Measures of delusion-proneness have
been shown to predict belief in fake news (Bronstein, Penny-
cook, Bear, Cannon, & Rand, 2018) or the paranormal (Ståhl
& van Prooijen, 2018). Further, delusion-prone people are
typically less able to integrate incoming evidence to update
their false beliefs, showing a Bias Against Disconfirmatory
Evidence (BADE, McLean et al., 2017), which make speak
to the inflexibility of collective delusions. What our approach
adds, by using the Beads Task — which is adapted from the
delusions literature (Huq et al., 1988) — and studying the
Jumping to Conclusions bias — which is thought to play a
role in the formation of delusions (Garety & Freeman, 2013)
— is a specific mechanism for bridging the social and indi-
vidual pathways in Fig. 1, as we experimentally controlled
the kind of social information shared in the social condition.
Third, we offer a concrete prediction about collective
delusions, on the basis of our results. We have argued that
the devaluation of evidence is a mechanism whereby so-
cial information can affect individual learning in such a way
as to stabilize misbeliefs. If that is the case, then when
two social groups take opposing sides in any disagreement
over empirically verifiable matters, we hypothesize that one
side will only be able to maintain their position long-term if
their group identity includes epistemic commitments, such
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as scorn of scientists as sources of empirical evidence, scorn
of journalists as sources of accurate reporting, and warnings
against doubting received wisdom (for instance, see James
1:6 ‘... the one who doubts is like a wave of the sea that
is driven and tossed by the wind’). Religion is an obvious
case where social identity carries epistemic injunctions, but
we are arguing that this could be a much more general phe-
nomenon. Naturally, the supposition that epistemic standards
can be part of, say, political ideology is hardly novel (cf. Or-
well’s Nineteen Eighty-Four), but we are proposing a specific
mechanism for why this may be a general phenomenon.
Our paradigm also includes several limitations. First, it
involves mathematical reasoning, and if people are mathe-
matically uncertain, then they may be more disposed to fol-
low social information (Cross, Brown, Morgan, & Laland,
2017). However, this is not incompatible with our claims: if
people are uncertain about whether the beads are worth see-
ing, but become more confident in drawing zero beads when
they see that others have done so, then this is merely one
way in which social information has the effect we are claim-
ing. Further, this is one reason we posed four related hy-
potheses. The simplest of these merely involves counting the
number of beads observed, which is simple enough for pri-
mary school mathematics. In any case, we modeled optimal
behavior in a way that incorporates probability and expected
value, but this was to support the analytic aim of comparing
human performance with an objective, optimal benchmark,
rather than to claim that many (or any) people actually carry
out such calculations. This research was originally motivated
by gaps in current explanations of collective delusions such
as climate change denial, and lay people are probably at least
as uncertain about the physics of climate change as they are
about the mathematics of probability in our task. Thus, un-
certainty is inherently a part of people’s decision making in
the phenomenon to be explained, rather than an unfortunate
accident in our empirical study of it.
Second, although the social information about bead draws
was strictly irrelevant, people may have assumed that this
information was relevant — indeed, the assumption of rele-
vance is foundational in human communication (Sperber &
Wilson, 1995) — and perhaps we should thus have probed
participants about their assumptions here. Indeed, this as-
sumption has been shown to explain apparently irrational be-
havior (Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995). However, appeal
to this principle alone cannot explain why social informa-
tion biased people towards drawing the minimum number of
beads (rather than the maximum, which was the other popu-
lar strategy). Thus, it does not undermine our account. Re-
latedly, although our design intentionally makes social in-
formation useless, we acknowledge both that it is frequently
useful — indeed, it is hard to see how our species would have
evolved to be such keen social learners, otherwise — and that
there are adaptive signals of its usefulness. For instance, it is
often beneficial to copy prestigious individuals (Henrich &
Gil-White, 2001), and displays of pride can serve as signals
of such prestige (Martens & Tracy, 2013). Nonetheless, we
wish to highlight that such matters concern deciding whom
to copy when copying, whereas our particular focus here has
been on how social information can discourage people from
engaging in individual learning, to detrimental effect.
Third, although we included an extensive system of com-
prehension checks, we did not check every aspect of partici-
pants’ understanding. It may have been worth checking that
participants had properly read the paragraph in the instruc-
tions from the social condition that said they would only see
how many beads had been drawn by previous participants (in
case they were confused and thought that the social infor-
mation displayed actual black beads seen) or that the bead
colors in the experimental task would not be the same as in
the demonstration.
Finally, it is somewhat surprising that we observed no in-
crease in the rate of Jumping to Conclusions as the transmis-
sion chain grew in length. We explore the data behind this
in some detail in the expanded analysis (https://osf.io/9f2ks),
but our best current explanation is based on the observation
that people vary in their base-level sensitivity to social in-
formation (Mesoudi, Chang, Dall, & Thornton, 2016; Molle-
man, Kurvers, & van den Bos, 2019). In our data, only a
subset of participants drew zero beads, and only a subset of
those participants can have done so because of the experi-
mental manipulation. Thus, as any effect of time would be
observable only for a subset of a subset of participants, and
as this subset of a subset of the population also vary in their
base-level sensitivity to social information (Molleman et al.,
2019), then it is unsurprising if it is hard to detect a signal of
how much social information is needed for this sub-subset of
people to be swayed.
We conclude with two questions for future research. First,
what, if anything, is cognitively distinctive about the partic-
ipants who were susceptible to the faulty intuition that the
evidence was worthless, or who tended to imitate this heuris-
tic in others? So far, we have mentioned JTC, a reliance
on intuition rather than evidence, and heterogeneous social-
information use, but another possibility might be that such
people are particularly intolerant of ambiguity. A 60:40 ratio
of bead colors involves more ambiguity than, say, a 75:25 ra-
tio. Higher tolerance of ambiguity is associated with curios-
ity about new information (J. A. Litman, 2010), whereas in-
tolerance of ambiguity is associated with conservatism (Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), itself a predictor of
some forms of science denial (Rutjens, Heine, et al., 2018).
A second question is, what patterns in social information are
responsible for our main effect? Our paradigm involves pre-
senting participants in the social condition with naturalistic
inputs, in the sense that these were veridical responses of
other participants at earlier time points. This was motivated
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by the desire to avoid deception (cf. Asch’s studies). How-
ever, this naturalistic data may have obscured any effect of
particular kinds of social information (for instance, the num-
ber of people who previously drew zero beads) and a different
approach will be needed to probe such effects.
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